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(Per NSC/ES 1600 3/19, new draft of NSDD "in typewriter" and will be sent to us ASAP - probably by COB 3/20.)

D/ Executive Secretary
19 March 84

Date 25X1

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Approved For Release 2009/06/03 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001100010033-6

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19 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Debrief - McFarlane Meeting, 17 March 1984

-- I stressed the importance of being able to clearly explain the terorrist structure as called for by Senator Nunn - with diagram. The NSDD has been redrafted and should be over here. If not, we can get it. Bud was not clear as to the status of the law against conspiring to maim, etc. He seemed to think a Justice Department opinion would handle the issue satisfactorily. I said that Vessey and I had objected at the NSPG and the issue thrashed out before issuing an NSDD.

matter strongly and promised a response to his -- Reviewed letter--have since become inclined to press for a broadened NSDD addressing policy as well as intelligence matters.

-- Discussed limitations on exploitation of Soviet POWs, as well as risks in pressing Pakistan--need to review where this stands and discuss whether there is any harm in dicussing the matter with the Paks. There is great ignorance about the facts about previous talks with Pakistanis and what they have been doing in passing out POWs. Need more facts and more careful discussion - Stilwell and Derwinski preparing for a special mission - seems like a strange way to handle this.

William J. Casey

SA/DCI/IA cc:

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